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Cukjati: Screen Used at Trial that Prevents TestifyingChild Sex Abuse Vict

CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT

OF CONFRONTATION-SCREEN USED AT
TRIAL THAT PREVENTS TESTIFYING CHILD SEX ABUSE VICTIM FROM
VIEWING ACCUSED VIOLATES ACCUSED'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT To

FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATION.

Coy v. Iowa, - U.S. _-, 108 S. Ct. 2798,

101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988).

John Avery Coy was arrested and charged with the sexual assault of two
thirteen-year-old girls while they were camping in his next door neighbor's
yard. According to the girls, Coy entered their tent and awoke them by
shining a light in their eyes and warning them to look away from him. Subsequent police interrogation revealed that the girls were unable to describe
their assailant's face.
At the beginning of Coy's trial, the state, relying on a recently enacted
Iowa statute, made a motion to allow the girls to testify behind a screen or
via closed-circuit television. The trial court sanctioned the use of a screen
placed in front of Coy during the girls' testimony. The screen enabled Coy
to dimly perceive the girls and hear their testimony, but prevented the girls
from seeing Coy at all.
Coy objected to the use of the screen on grounds that it would violate both
his right to confrontation and his right to a fair trial. Coy first argued that
use of the screen would violate his rights under the confrontation clause,
which guarantees the criminal defendant the right to unobstructed face-toface confrontation of adverse witnesses. He further argued that his right to
due process and a fair trial would be violated because using the screen would
create an appearance of guilt, thus diminishing the presumption of innocence. The trial court denied both constitutional claims, and the jury subsequently convicted Coy of two counts of engaging in lascivious acts with a
child.
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Coy's conviction. The court rejected
Coy's confrontation argument on the grounds that using the screen did not
impair Coy's ability to cross-examine the girls, therefore, there was no confrontation clause violation. The majority also refused to accept Coy's due
process argument by deciding that the screening procedure did not unduly
prejudice the jury and thus, did not compromise Coy's right to a fair trial.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Iowa Supreme Court, holding that the confrontation clause extends to the
accused a right to face-to-face confrontation of the witnesses appearing
against him at trial. The Court concluded that the screening procedure au-
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thorized by the Iowa statute denied Coy this right. Finding it unnecessary
to reach Coy's due process claim, the Court remanded the case for determination of whether the confrontation clause violation was harmless error.
In recent years, there has been increasing public awareness of the rising
occurrence of sexual abuse of children in our society. See Watson, Special
Report: A Hidden Epidemic, Newsweek, May 14, 1984, at 30 col. 3 (statistics reveal that between 100,000 and 500,000 American children will be sexually molested this year); see also Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in
Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806,
806 (1985)(media has focused increased attention on growing statistics of
child abuse). Due to the inherent difficulties in prosecuting the perpetrators
of these crimes, the conviction rates in such cases remain consistently low.
See Note, Does the Child Witness Videotape Statute Violate the Confrontation
Clause?: Article 38.071, Texas Code of CriminalProcedure, 17 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1669, 1671 (1986)(criminal justice system unable to effectively prosecute because typically only evidence of sexual abuse is child's testimony and
long delays, courtroom pressures and need to face offender make preservation of testimony nearly impossible); see also State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d
1330, 1342 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984)(child victims' reluctance to face
offenders often results in abandonment of prosecutions). In response to
these problems, many state legislatures have enacted statutes which provide
for new technological means of enabling the prosecution to preserve a child
witness' testimony for use at trial, without forcing the child to physically
face the accused. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, §§ 3,
4 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(child victim's testimony admissible through closedcircuit television); IOWA CODE ANN. § 91OA(14) (West Supp. 1987)(permitting use of screen placed between accused and testifying child victim); TENN.
CODE ANN. 24-7-116 (Supp. 1987)(authorizing admission of child victim's
pre-trial videotaped testimony at trial). See generally Comment, The Revision of Article 38.071 After Long v. State: The Troubles of a Child Shield
Law in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 290 (1988)(statutes of twenty-two
states allow closed-circuit television and thirty-seven states permit pre-trial
videotaped recordings). The common purpose of these statutes is to facilitate efficient disposition of child sex abuse cases, while also protecting the
psychological well-being of the child victim. See Comment, Article 3& 071 of
the Texas Code of CriminalProcedure: A Legislative Response to the Needs
of Children in the Courtroom, 18 ST. MARY'S L. J. 279, 280-81 (1986); see
also Coyle, Application of Confrontation Clause: A Difficult Issue in Child
Abuse Cases, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 1 col. 3, 4 (statutes permitting use
of new technologies are response to societal discontent over increasing incidence of child sexual abuse, and are designed to protect child victim from
traumatic in-court testimony). Although the innovative procedures that
these statutes create may prove effective for achieving such laudable goals,
their use raises important questions regarding the extent to which legislation
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enacted to protect child witnesses can permissibly infringe upon a defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, in
part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. .. ." U.S. CONST.
AMEND. VI; see also Pointerv. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)(sixth amendment right to confrontation fundamental right binding upon states through
fourteenth amendment due process clause). This portion of the amendment,
commonly referred to as the confrontation clause, generally bars the admission of hearsay at trial. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155
(1970)(confrontation clause and hearsay rules afford similar protection by
excluding hearsay evidence from trial). Admission of hearsay evidence is
precluded because of the common belief that out-of-court statements are not
trustworthy or accurate. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298
(1973); see also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 3
(1974)(judicial practice of excluding hearsay statements established to guard
against admission of untrustworthy and erroneous evidence). The United
States Supreme Court has given effect to this belief by consistently interpreting the confrontation clause as requiring that the accused be given adequate
opportunity to effectively cross-examine adverse witnesses in open court in
view of the jury. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987);
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895). These decisions and others reflect the Court's deepseated conviction that the interrelated guarantees of face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination operate as important vehicles through which the
reliability of evidence is promoted. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
158 (1970)(confrontation clause assures reliability of witness' statement by
requiring witness to be confronted and cross-examined while making statement); see also Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43. As a consequence, the Court has
steadfastly protected these rights, going so far as to say that their unjust
denial "would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount
of want of prejudice would cure it." Brookhartv. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1965).
Despite the Court's traditional reluctance to sanction infringements on a
defendant's right to cross-examination and confrontation, it has declined to
designate these rights as being absolute, instead acknowledging that "competing state interests... may warrant dispensing with [them] at trial." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64. Although the Court has renounced any attempt to
define either what a "competing interest" is, or when a "competing interest"
will be sufficient to override confrontation clause guarantees, it has recognized exceptions whereby an accused's right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses can be permissibly denied. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (hearsay statement admissible if prosecution demonstrates declarant unavailable
and statement possesses sufficient indicia of reliability); Parkerv. Randolph,
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442 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1979)(denial of right to confrontation may be harmless
error); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965)(admission of dying declaration of witness who was not subject to cross-examination and confrontation). In formulating these exceptions, the Court has stated that both public
policy considerations and the legitimate need of a state to conduct an effective criminal justice system may sometimes defeat a defendant's right to confrontation. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64; see also Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295
(although defendant's right to confrontation not absolute, denial of right requires close examination of competing interests).
In recent years, many lower courts have been called upon to decide
whether the protection of child witnesses is a sufficient competing interest to
justify the denial to an accused of the right to physically confront the child
witness at trial. The majority of these decisions can be classified into three
groups. The first group includes decisions addressing the constitutionality of
statutes providing for mechanisms or procedures designed to prevent the testifying child witness from seeing the accused. Compare State v. Coy, 397
N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 1986)(use of semi-opaque screen separating accused
from child witnesses did not violate accused's right of confrontation) with
Herbert v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)(defendant's right to confront witness abridged when defendant forced to sit
where he can hear but not see child witness). Included in the second group
are decisions addressing the constitutionality of statutes allowing into evidence the pre-trial videotaped testimony of child sex abuse victims. Compare McGuire v. State, 706 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Ark. 1986)(constitutional) and
State v. Cooper, 353 S.E.2d 451, 456 (S.C. 1987)(constitutional) with United
States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 1979)(unconstitutional) and
Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(unconstitutional).
The final group encompasses decisions addressing the constitutionality of
statutes authorizing the prosecution to introduce the child witness' testimony via two-way closed circuit television. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 377 (Mass. 1988)(unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Ky. 1986)(constitutional); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 531 A.2d 459, 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)(constitutional).
The pivotal issue in these cases is whether the confrontation clause requires the testifying child witness to physically confront the accused in open
court in view of the jury. See generally Comment, The Revision of Article
38.071 After Long v. State: The Troubles of a Child Shield Law in Texas, 40
BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 286 (1988)(issue whether eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation required). Proponents of "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation contend
that this procedure ensures the reliability and veracity of the testimony elicited. See Benfield, 593 F.2d at 817; see also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
EVIDENCE § 800[01] (1979)(requirement of personal presence makes it difficult to lie if accused present at trial). Furthermore, these proponents argue
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that the right to "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation should be an indispensable element in child sex-abuse trials where the possibility of false accusations
and irreparable damage to the accused is increased. See Willis, 716 S.W.2d
at 226 (citing trial court opinion). Proponents of the child counter the first
argument by contending that the "reliability of an abused child's testimony
does not depend upon his or her ability to withstand the psychological
trauma of testifying in a courtroom under the unwavering gaze" of the accused. Ludwig, 531 A.2d at 463 (right to confrontation includes neither
right to intimidate nor right to "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation); see also
Cooper, 353 S.E.2d at 456 (absence of eye-to-eye confrontation did not lessen
reliability of child's testimony). On the contrary, as long as the child is subject to full and effective cross-examination, eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation
is neither constitutionally required nor necessary to guarantee the reliability
of the testimony elicited. See Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1343; see also Willis,
716 S.W.2d at 230. Alternatively, these proponents argue that even assuming that face-to-face confrontation is required by the sixth amendment, the
procedures authorized by child shield statutes provide the functional
equivalent of (and therefore a constitutional substitute for) face-to-face confrontation. See Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 230; accordState v. Daniels, 484 So.2d
941, 945 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
Before Coy v. Iowa, Supreme Court authority discussing the specific issue
of face-to-face confrontation, particularly in the context of child sex abuse
cases, was minimal. In fact, most of the Court's encounters with the sixth
amendment confrontation clause have involved restrictions on the clause's
less explicit component, the right to cross-examination. See, e.g., Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 309 (1974)(requiring that criminal defendant be allowed to impeach credibility of prosecution witness by cross-examination);
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1965)(lower court's refusal to
allow defendant to cross-examine co-defendant violated defendant's right to
adequate cross-examination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965)(admission of statement by declarant who defendant had no opportunity to
cross-examine violated defendant's right to confrontation). These decisions
have repeatedly emphasized that the primary purpose underlying the right
to confrontation is to guarantee the accused the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him. See, e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. at 315-16; Douglas,
380 U.S. at 418; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406-07. Indeed, language used by the
Court in more recent opinions arguably demonstrates that an "adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the clause even in the absence of
physical confrontation." Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418; see also Kentucky v.
Stincer, - U.S. -,
,
107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 643
(1987)(confrontation clause guarantees only opportunities for effective crossexamination). Proponents of an unequivocal right to eye-to-eye confrontation argue, however, that Supreme Court decisions have consistently interpreted the clause to confer at least "a right to meet face-to-face all those who
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appear and give evidence at trial." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175
(1970); see also Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106; Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 330; Kirby, 174
U.S. at 55. This latter view finds support in more recent decisions of the
Court, which assert that "it is this literal right to confront' the witness at the
time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause." Green, 399 U.S. at 157; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39, 51 (1987)(confrontation clause provides both right to face accusers and
right to conduct cross-examination).
The United States Supreme Court finally resolved the dispute regarding
the scope of the confrontation clause by holding that it requires eye-to-eye
confrontation in Coy v. Iowa,

-

U.S. -,

-,

108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803, 101 L.

Ed. 2d 857, 867 (1988). In reversing the Iowa Supreme Court's conviction
of Coy, the majority dismissed the state's argument that the confrontation
clause only extends to the criminal defendant a right to cross-examination of
adverse witnesses. Id. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2800, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 864. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia asserted that adopting such a construction would ignore the obvious intent of the clause in conferring "a face-toface meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." Id. This
core guarantee serves the general perception that "there is something deep in
human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and
accuser as essential to a fair trial in criminal prosecutions." Id. at -, 108 S.
Ct. at 2801, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 865. The majority further recognized that eyeto-eye confrontation, by its very nature, tends to confound and reveal the
false accuser. Id. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2802, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 866. Therefore,
the majority concluded that this right must be preserved to "ensure the integrity of the fact-finding process." Id.
After concluding that the screening procedure violated Coy's right to faceto-face confrontation, the Court addressed the state's argument that the necessity of protecting child sex abuse victims outweighed Coy's right to confrontation. Id. The Court conceded that it had, in past decisions, balanced
the rights guaranteed by the confrontation clause against other important
state interests. Id. The rights balanced in these cases, however, were only
reasonably implicit in the clause. See id. (included in these are right to
cross-examination, right to exclude hearsay statements and right to physical
confrontation at non-critical point in proceedings). The majority stressed
that it was more reluctant to make exceptions to the right to face-to-face
confrontation because this right is "narrowly and explicitly set forth in the
clause" and constitutes "the irreducible literal meaning of the clause." Id. at
-, 108 S.Ct. at 2802-03, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 867. Justice Scalia expressly
declined to answer whether any exceptions to this right exist, but stated that
if there were, they would certainly be granted only when necessary to affect
an important public policy. See id. The state argued that this necessity was
established by the statute, which created a legislatively imposed determina-
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tion of trauma. See id. The majority disagreed, however, holding that
"something more that the type of generalized finding underlying such a statute is needed when the exception is not 'firmly ...

rooted in our jurispru-

dence.'" Id. Because the exception created in the Iowa statute was not
firmly rooted in law, nor were any individualized findings made that the
child witnesses in this case were in need of special protection, the majority
concluded that Coy's conviction "could not be sustained by any conceivable
exception." Id.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority's holding that Coy's confrontation rights had been violated through the use of the screen and that a generalized legislative determination of necessity was insufficient to justify the
violation. See Coy v. Iowa, - U.S. , -, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803-04, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 858, 868 (1988)(O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justice wrote separately, however, in an attempt to clarify the Court's holding and to limit its
scope. Id. Justice O'Connor took note of the various state statutes which
provide for closed-circuit television procedures in child sex abuse cases, and
argued that the majority's decision did not necessarily doom such legislative
efforts to protect child witnesses. Id. Reiterating the Court's position that
the confrontation clause is not absolute, Justice O'Connor concluded that
the clause's protections may, in certain future circumstances, give way to the
"compelling state interest of protecting child witnesses." Id. at -, 108 S.
Ct. at 2804-05, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 869-70 (suggesting that case-specific finding
of necessity sufficient to override defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation).
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the
majority's holding. Coy v. Iowa, - U.S.., -, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2805, 101
L. Ed. 2d 858, 870 (1988)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent considered
Coy's confrontation claim to be premised on the extremely narrow objection
that the child witnesses could not see him during their testimony. Id. Such
a claim had no basis in either the common law or Supreme Court precedent.
Id. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 2806-07, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 871-72 (no authority for
defendant's asserted right that witnesses be able to see him while testifying).
Justice Blackmun argued that even if this right were protected, it should be
subordinated to the significant state interest in protecting child witnesses
from traumatizing in-court testimony. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2807, 101 L.
Ed. 2d at 873-74. The dissent concluded that the majority's requirement of a
case-specific finding of such trauma was equally flawed in that it also ignored
the Court's prior decisions which have sanctioned generally applicable exceptions to the confrontation clause. Id. (citing Federal Rules of Evidence
801(d)(2), 803(2) and 803(6), which make admissible statements of co-conspirator, excited utterances and business records).
It is not entirely clear what impact the Coy decision will have on state
efforts to both effectively prosecute child sex offenders while also protecting
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child witnesses. This determination invariably rests on conjecture as to how
lower courts will choose to interpret the holding in Coy that the confrontation clause guarantees a right to a face-to-face meeting between witness and
accused. If the Court's decision is narrowly construed to prohibit only the
use of trial devices which prevent the witness from seeing the accused at
trial, then the holding will likely have little impact on the prosecution of
child sex abuse cases. This conclusion would follow from the fact that Iowa
was the only state to have authorized the type of screen that was used in the
Coy case. See Coy, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2804, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 868
(O'Connor, J., concurring). A full majority of the states have, however, enacted statutes authorizing the use of either videotape equipment or closedcircuit television to present the testimony of child sex abuse victims. Id.
While these statutes differ in some respects, the majority provide for certain
procedures which either prevent the testifying child from seeing the defendant at trial or allow the child witness to testify through a television monitor
from a room separate from the courtroom, jury and accused. Compare 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 5984 (Purdon Supp. 1987)(preventing child from seeing
or hearing defendant during videotaping) with KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986)(allowing live testimony of child to
be taken outside courtroom and televised by closed-circuit television). If the
holding in Coy is interpreted as requiring that the child witness testify while
facing the accused in open court and in the presence of the judge and jury,
then it is likely that most of these statutes will be ruled unconstitutional. See
Comment, The Revision ofArticle 38.071 After Long v. State: The Troubles
of a Child Shield Law in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 287 (1988)(if
Court in Coy holds eye-to-eye confrontation required, all closed-circuit statutes would be unconstitutional and only videotape statutes requiring defendant's presence and face-to-face confrontation would survive).
In recent years, the highest courts of many states have addressed the constitutionality of the use of videotaping or closed-circuit television in child sex
abuse cases. Compare Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Ky.
1986)(Kentucky statute constitutional which permits use of closed-circuit
testimony in child sex abuse cases) and State v. Cooper, 353 S.E.2d 451 (S.C.
1987)(South Carolina statute constitutional which allows child witness' testimony presented by videotaping) with Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524
N.E.2d 366, 377 (Mass. 1988)(closed-circuit testimony in child sex abuse
cases unconstitutional absent case-specific finding of compelling state interest) and State v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245, 1255 (Conn. 1987)(videotape testimony of child outside presence of defendant unconstitutional unless clear
and convincing evidence demonstrates compelling need). The courts that
have approved of the use of videotaping and closed-circuit television argue
that these procedures present no constitutional problems because they act as
interchangeable substitutes for eye-to-eye confrontation and operate to ensure the reliability of the child's testimony. See, e.g., Willis, 716 S.W.2d at

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol20/iss1/8

8

Cukjati: Screen Used at Trial that Prevents TestifyingChild Sex Abuse Vict

1988]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

228 (video monitor constitutionally acceptable substitute for face-to-face
confrontation); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 531 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987)(no constitutional right of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation and closedcircuit testimony fully reliable); Cooper, 353 S.E.2d at 456 (reliability of
child's testimony presented by videotape not lessened because defendant prevented from confronting child). In contrast, courts that have disapproved
the use of videotaping and closed-circuit television have stressed that these
procedures are poor substitutes for face-to-face confrontation because they
fail to facilitate the presentation of reliable evidence. See Bergstrom, 524
N.E.2d at 375-76 (procedures may distort witness' credibility, impair jury's
ability to adequately judge demeanor of witness, and interfere with crossexamination); see also Jarzbek, 529 A.2d at 1250-51 (confrontation through
closed-circuit television or videotape not equivalent to face-to-face confrontation). Judging from the disparate results that the states have reached on
the issue of videotaped or closed-circuit testimony, it is clear that the United
States Supreme Court will again need to address the conflict between a defendant's right to confrontation and state attempts to protect child witnesses.
In conclusion, the Court in Coy held that the sixth amendment confrontation clause guarantees a defendant the right to physically confront the child
witness before the trier of fact. The Court premised its holding on the belief
that face-to-face confrontation heightens the reliability of the child's testimony and enhances the overall "integrity of the fact finding process."
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295. Reasoning that eye-to-eye confrontation before
the jury serves an independent truth-evocative function and constitutes "the
irreducible literal meaning of the clause," the Court concluded that any possible exceptions to this right could only be made when necessary to affect an
important public policy. Although the Court did not positively conclude
that a state's asserted interest in protecting child witnesses would never be
sufficient to override a defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation, it did
make clear that a case-specific finding of such necessity must be reached
before any such exception would be considered. The issue left open by the
Court's opinion, and one it will soon be required to address, is whether a
closed-circuit television or videotape procedure based on a case-specific finding of necessity will be regarded as unconstitutional under the confrontation
clause.
Curtis L. Cukjati
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